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Shaping a New International
Financial System:
Contributions and Challenges
KARL KAISER, JOHN J. KIRTON , AND JOSEPH P. DANIELS

Introduction: The Crisis and the Challenge

As the 1990s unfolded, citizens of the international community seemed
destined to bid farewell to a turbulent twentieth century with a ce lebrat ion of
the end of the European cold war, the global spread of market democracies in
its wake, and the buoyant prosperity and expanding freedoms they brought.
Instead, the century closed with the globa l comm unity engu lfed in an
unprecedentedly severe financial crisis that devastated many of the wor ld ' s
most rapidly growing economies, threatened the world 's most mature and
powerful countries. and called into question the mechanism and very model
of a globalised international economy a nd community.
The floating of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 catalysed a contagious
sequence of financial meltdowns . Over the subsequent year these devastated
not on ly Thailand but also Indonesia, the world 's fourth most populous
country, and Organisation for Econom ic Co-operation and Devel opment
(OECD) member South Korea, imperiled such traditional bastion of stable
growth as Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the People' Republic of China, and
helped plunge the world 's second largest economy, Japan, into deeper
recession . On 17 August 1997, the crisis spread to Europe. when. three weeks
after the latest infusion of financial support from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the Group of Eight (G8)'s newest member Russia was forced to
devalue its currency and default on its loans. Within a month . the globa l panic
unleashed by the Ru sian default battered other G8 countries sllch as Ca nada.
and threatened to paralyse the financial system of the world 's most powerful
and superb ly performing economy, the United tates . As 1998 moved into
1999 it was the America's wh ich were afflicted. as Brazil faced a major run
on its reserves and a sharp recession as a result. As Group of Seven (G7) and
G8 leaders gathered in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999 tor their 25'h annual
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ummit, a preca ri o u ca lm preva il ed, a ltho ugh strai ns in Argentin a, and later
South Korea, ke pt everyo ne in a state of ne rvo us vig ilance. T he foc us had
hi fted fro m the mirac le to the me ltdown of emerg in g eco no mi e in A ia a nd
e lsewhe re, fro m the magic to th e ma ni a of the marketplace, fro m acco lades to
a nx ieties about g loba li satio n, a nd from the vigo ur to the vulne rab ility of the
leadin g industri a l democrac ies and the internati o nal in stituti ons they had
constructed to gove rn g loba l fin ance.
The G7 countries the mse lves escaped, ifby the nan'owe t of marg in s, the
most devastating effects of the cri s is. But fo r the ma ny countri es who did not,
, the destructi o n it bro ught surpassed that of the great de press io n of the 193 0s.
Moreover, the speed with whi ch it s pread, the broad scope of the countri e it
we pt up in its gras p, and the w ide number of indi vidua ls w ithin the m whose
life prospects we re destroyed, gave it a unique characte r. T he failure of the
wo rld 's leadin g natio nal authorities, internatio na l. in stituti o ns, o r market
acto rs to foresee its o utbreak, predict its course, o r confide ntl y contain its
c umulati ve devastation re inforce d the co ll ecti ve rea l isati o n that the
intern atio na l fin a nc ia l economy of the twe n'ty-first century was very di ffe rent
in kind tha n that whi ch had proceed ed it. T he cri s is a lso made obv ious that,
in a n interde pendent wor ld economy, more than mere o penness to fo re ig n
capita l and a free in vestme nt clim ate was necessary to g uara ntee a stable
evo lutio n, but that man y conditio ns for the deve lopment of market econo m ies
in the developed wo rld , whi ch had been v ita l but ge ne ra ll y overlooked. were
of equa l impo rtance, such as the rule of law, regulati o ns concernin g the
re li a bili ty of balance sheets, bankruptcy law, or rul es fo rbiddin g corrupti on.
It further bred a convict io n that a fundamentally new arc hitecture for its
inte rn ational gove rn ance had to be constru cted if an o pe n inte rn atio na l
fin anc ia l syste m was to continue, and be contro ll ed in ways that benefited a ll.
T he c halle nge of creating that new a rchitecture unleashed a series of
inte nse debates over several fundamental and interre lated qu estio ns. Wh at
was the rea l cause of the As ian finan c ial cris is and the contag io n w hi c h
bro ug ht it w ith such fo rce to most reg ions of the wo rld , and to many, but not
a ll , of the countries w ithin them ? How best could the c ris is be conta ined a nd
who sho uld take the lead, and bea r the burden , in so doing? Was there a trul y
g lo ba l ised rather than regio na lised inte rnational econo my. and to what degree
a nd in what ways was it different than that which had proceeded it? Was a
new a rc hitecture required to gove rn it, o r mere ly a et of improve ments and
additi ons for the plumbing a nd the metres that regul ated and mo nito red it?
What principles and processes should guide the renovatio n effort, and w hat
new procedures and mechanisms hould be put in place? And who, w ithin
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international institutions, national governm ents, privare mark ets. civi Isoc iety.
and citizens of an ever more connected global community. shoul d guide and
govern the emerg ing market sy tem '?
These debates st ill rage in intell ectual ircles. But long betore they will
have come to command a consensus, indeed from the very ea rl y stages of the
crisis, leaders of the international com munity equipped with only tentative
answers and fragile confidence have been forced to confro nt the crisis and
begin constructing an architecture that co uld cope with ir, conta in it. and
vastly reduce the chances that it would return . In doing so they had to in ve nt
and institute a structure that wo uld meet the needs of an in creas in gly
globali sed financial system and th e a piration of those throughout th e world
we ll beyond the financial community who were so pro to undl y affected by it.
It was an effort that mob ili sed the energies and enthu siasm of many. But at th e
very centre of the effort were the deliberations, debates,. clirections. and
dec isions of the Group of Seven lead ing industri al democracies .

The Approach

This book ex plores the eff0l1 to contain the global financial cri s is that erupted
in 1997, to construct a new internati onal financial system in its wake, and
fo rmali se the role in this process of the G7, it international in stitutional
co ll eagues and co mpetitors, and its member governments and tinancial
co mmunities. It embraces a ll of the fundamental question s unl eashed by the
crisis that still dominate analytical and policy debates. Yet its tocu s is on how
well the cris is response and reconstruction 'effort. importantl y shaped and
guided by the G7, has proceeded as the new century beg in s.
This collection thus has three central purposes. First and toremost, it
criti ca lly assesses efforts thus far to co nstruct a new. strengthened
international financial system to meet the needs of the globa l economy and
community in the rapidly global ising wo rld of the twenty- first century.
Second Iy, it chall enges core elements of the .ep istem ic consensus underl yi ng
thi s effort by subjecting the premi ses and principles of the emerging ed iti cc
to a hard analysis of their economic logic, market impact. and political
feasibi lity. Thirdly, it offers suggestions about which direction s 1'0 avo id. and
which to pursue as the proj ect to construct a strengthened internati onal
fin anci al system moves into the decisive tinal stages required tor its
completion .
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To meet these objectives, thi s collection assembles the analyses ofl eading
experts from the scho larly and po l icy world . It embraces the talents of those
within gove rnment, private sector finance, and the academic/resea rch
community. Its analysis is firml y grounded in the economics of internatio nal
finance, and supplemented by the ins ights of political sc ience and
management studies. It includes experts from Europe, North America and
Asia, and from all G7 member countries, as well as a v iew from the world
o utside. In many cases the insights of these authors have been shaped by their
direct experience. in the past or present, in shaping a nd manag ing the
international financial system. But in all cases they bring to bear o utstandin g
academic and analytic credentials and the critical di stance that tlows from
them .
No effort has been made to impose a common analytical o r interpretive
framework to g uide these contributions. Each has \2een guided by the dual
discipline of focussing on fundamental issues in the effort to shape a
strengthened financial system , and to do so in a critical spirit guided by an
independent analysis of underlying premises and processes . As a result, thi s
collection reflects the diversity of the debate and points to new directions for
advance, as each author addresses the core issues from a distinctive vantage
point.

The Core Issues
Taken together, these analyses address the five core issues at the heart of th e
contemporary debate over shaping a strengthened international financial
system . These deal with why the crisis came, how well the existing system
responded, what more is needed now, which sector sho uld bear the burden,
and who should take the lead .
The first concerns the causes of the crisis and contagion and whethe r it
has now bee n finally contained. How different was it from pa nics, mani as.
and depress ions past? With the ins ig hts generated by the Mex ica n pe 0
deva luation of December 20. 1994, the collapse of Barin gs Bank in the sprin g
of 1995 . a nd the focus of the G7 o n internatio na l financial system reform at
their 1995 Ha lifax Summit, could it have been anticipated and prevented?
Was the crisis fundamentally the result of a collection of po licy and
institutional defects with in particu lar countries, if at broadly s im i lar stages of
development, or was the crisis essentially driven by the dynam ics of a newl y
globalised international system and the inadequacies of the principles.
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procedures, and institutio ns for its gove rnance? Has e no ugh n o \~ bcen done
to contain and conclude the c ri s is. or is· there mere ly a c urrent respi te until it
res umes in its next stage?
The second core issue, flowing directly from the first, is how a nd how
well the international community has coped with the challenges o r crisi s
response and system strengthening thus far. Is the challenge one of calling for
incremental reform, deeper reconstruction. or historic replacement with a very
new system of principles practices, processes, and set of institutio ns? Whether
the challenge be one of architecture or plumbing, is the project proceeding
quickly enough? And is it unfolding in the correct direction. with an overall
coherence and adequate allowance for experimentation. and subsequent m idcourse correction?
The third core iss ue focusses on the particular critical defects of the o ld
system and the best design for the new mechanisms to be added in respo nse.
What is the best weighting and mix of mechanism s for transparency.
surveillance, precautionary lending, and international standstill or bankrupt€y
procedures? What are the best forms, procedures, and equence of
introduction and lise for each? Is it necessary to move into broader domains.
such as control of international financial and capital flows, greater exchange
rate management, fixity, or even currency unification. and the rul es for
internationalliberalisation or foreign direct investment? How does o ne g uard
against consequences such as moral hazard?
The fourth issue is the relative respons ibility and ro le - pa. t and
prospective, positive and no rmati ve - of internatio nal in stitution s. nati o nal
governments. and private sector market players in the design and operation of
the new system . How much and how should the principle of pri vate sector
burden sharing be instituted? What volume and form of additional public
sector resources are required and where should they come fro m and be
controlled? And what place do other civil soc iety actors and the ir concern
have in the new architecture?
The fifth issue is the past, present, and prospective role of the G7, its
governments, the financial community and citizens. in prov iding leadership
and guidance in the construction and governa nce of the new system . Is it the
United States alone or the G7 as a co llective that has been. and re mai ns the
necessa ry centre of leadership and guidance? What ha been the ro le. and
what role should broader processes such as tlie new Group of 22 (G22) a nd
now Group of Twenty (G20) and Financial Stability Forum (FSF) o r the
established IMF, World 8ank, International Organisation of Sec urities
Control Organisations (IOSCO) and other bodies play? And what is the best
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practi ca l fo rmula fo r in vo lving those o uts ide th e ex istin g centres of
intern ati onal fin a nc ia l gove rn ance, so that the necessary ex perti se. leg itim acy.
surve i Ila nce, a nd sa nctio ns ca n be sec ured?

The Analyses
To address these core iss ues. it is necessary to ex plo re in turn ea rlier effo rts
to shape a nd strengthen the intern ati o na l fin a nc ia l syste m. the actua l c ri ses o f
, 1997-99, the spec ific issues at the hea rt of current effOlt to construct a new
syste m, and the broader array of iss ues c lose ly re lated to the proces . T hu ,
Part I conside rs past successes and fa i lures thro ug h the curre nt cri s is. fro m its
o ri g ins in As ia, through its impact on emerg ing and G7 econo mi es aro und the
wo rld , and the res po nse of the G7 a nd its membi!rs at conta inm ent and
contro l.
C hapter 2 beg in s w ith a n a na lys is of efforts durin g th e past qua rte r
century to reform the internatio na l fi na nc ia l syste m. and the ro le of the G7 in
thi s enterpri se. In exa mining "T he G7 Summit ' s Contributio n: Past. Present,
and Pros pecti ve". Ni cho las Bay ne ide nti fies fo ur earlie r definin g mome nts
w hen the wo rld , and the G7, confro nted as a centra l cha ll enge the tas k of
a lte rin g in bas ic ways a fi nanc ia l system unde r severe stress. T he fi rst was the
cris is over the g lo ba l exchange rate regi me that served as ve ry ra i.l'ol7 d 'eIr e
fo r the birth of the G7 sUll1mit as an economic institution - the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods syste m of fixed exc hange rates in 1971. th e fa ilure of the
IM F and ex istin g processes to construct a dura ble, w ide ly acce pted
a ltern ati ve, a nd the dec is ion of the fi rst Summit at Ra mbouill et, France in
1975 to institute a new syste m of managed fl oating. T he second was the
commerc ia l bank de bt cris is prec ipita ted by Mex ico ' s de./clclo defa ult at th e
1M F meetin gs in To ro nto in 1982. a nd the wo rk of G7 ull1m its fro m
Ve rsa ill es in 1982 to Pa ri s in 1989 to arri ve ti nal ly, in the fo rm of the Brady
Pl an, at a so lutio n. T he third epi sode, de bt re li ef fo r the wo rl d ' s poorest
co untries, began w ith the "Toronto term s" fo r re lief at the 1998 Summit and
continued thro ug h to the Co logne de bt initiat ive of 1999 . T he fi na l quest fo r
the G7 has been its effort to cope with specul ati ve fi na nc ia l crises. startin g at
Ha li fax in 1995 and continuin g to the present day .
From thi s ana lys is tl ow five conc lu s io ns. T he tirst is the unique
o ppo rtuni ty the Summi t o ffers G7 leade rs to reso lve issues that have detied
so luti o n at lower leve l . T he second is the need fo r adva nce prepa rat ion so
leaders can use the ir tim e most effective ly. whil e the third is the need to keep
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up the hi gh leve l press ure until commitments are fo rged a nd implemented .
The fourth is the need to move beyond the info rm a l leade rship or th e (j7 tll
integrate the new arrangements into formal o rga ni sati ons and give them lega l
force. The fifth is the indi spensabl e need for the G7 to lead. but a lso throug h
the ir own example. exp lanation, and sensiti vity to the des ires of o uts ide rs. to
secure a broader acceptance for the ir actions.
In C hapter 3, "The Asian C ri s is and its Implications". Takashi Kiu c hi
looks. from a Japanese perspective, at the o ri g ins and cau es of the A ian
tinancial crisis. Japan ' s interpretatio n of and respon se to the c ri s is. and th e
lessons that can be appl ied to the task of rebu i Iding the inte rn atio na I tina nc ia I
a rchitecture. He locates the ultim ate causes of the cris is in capi ta l acco unt
rather than current acco unt probl ems. Iiq uid ity rather than ' o lve ncy pro blem s.
and th e he rdin g be havi our of investors. but notes a lso how po liti c ia ns
overridin g th e ir offic ia ls and reg ulators compo unded the problem . .Iapa n·s
re ponse came initia ll y in the form o f a proposa l to r an As ian mo neta ry fund
that was abandoned in the face orus o ppos iti o n. then with a "New M iyazawa
Initiative" of US$30 billion worth o f bilateral le nding g uarantees. pro posa ls
to reform the IM F. and new meas ures to make the ye n a n internati o nal
currency. The major lessons orthe cri s is. Kiu c hi concludes. are the need to r
dec isive action at early stages. for e nhancin g the I MF s a utho rity to dea l w ith
capital account problem s. and closer regional po l icy co-ordinati o n. beginn ing
w ith macroecono mic po licy and the development of an As ia n bo nd market to
replace short-term borrowing from di stant bankers.
Kiuch i' s a nal ys is leads him to c lear conclus io ns o n many of the key issues
in the debate over a new architecture. He rejects dollarisation as a so luti o n lo r
sma ll er Asian economies, but approves of sho rt terms ca pital restri ct ions as
a tran s itio nal measure. mandatory private sector burden harin g. and state
bankruptcy codes. He ca ll s for universa l guide l ines and processes lo r
accounting, disclosure. bankruptcy. and tinancial superv is ion. But heca ll s tor
a staged approach to introduce these new mea ure . ti g htl y ta il o red to the
particular s ituation of each country, w ith proper macroeco no mic policy
re info rc ing improved internat ional regul at io l) . Aboveall. he identities the rol e
o f the G7 in mov in g toward a dell/C/O target zo ne mechani m. and points to
the benefits that further moves in this directi o n co uld brin g.
In ha pter 4. ''The G7. Intern ati ona l Fina nce. and Deve lo pin g Countries".
Duncan Wood analyses the wo rk o f th e G7 ill o perating and re lo rming the
international financial syste m from the per pective o f tht: devdop ill g
countries. in particular, that of the ten large emerging market econo m ies . The
c hapter first ex plores the record of the G7 durin g the decade from the late
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1980s to the late 1990s, identi fy in g how the developing countries have bee n
affected by G7 initiati ves in mac roeconomic co-ordin ation. debt renegotiation
and reduction , and internat iona l financial sy tem reform . It then focusses on
the main ach ievements of the 1999 Co logne Summ it that affect developing
countries, notably the Co logne debt initiati ve, broadening the membership of
the Financial Stability Forum , and the increased impOJ1ance accorded to the
IMF Interim Committee, now renamed the International Financ ial and
Monetary Committee. Wood a lso examines why and how the G7 mi ght move
toward a more meaningfu l dialogue with , and inclusion of, the majo r
,emerging economies, in the interest of improv ing the effectiveness and
leg itimacy of the intern ational financial system be ing shaped to govern the
g lobal econom y of the future.
Wood 's co nc lusions are critical yet constructive. He .iudges that the G 7
in the past has inadeq uate ly incorporated the views of developing cou ntrie
as it has dealt with the issues that directly concern tl;em. While the Co logne
Summit brought some improvement, its advances remain inadequate to the
need to involve the large emerg ing economi es as they ri se in re lati ve power,
and" as their economic performance becomes ever more consequential to that
of the G7 countries themselves. The clear need is to dev i e better proce ses
for regular, formali sed G7-emerging economy dialogue and consultation,
based in part on the mode ls that other international institutions have recentl y
evo lved.
In C hapter 5, "The Dynami cs ofG7 Leadership in Cri sis Response and
System Reconstructi on " John 1. Kirton exp lores the ro le of the G7, and of the
lesser members within it, in responding to the crisis and constructi ng a new
international tinancial arc hi tect ure. He traces the dipl omacy of and within the
G7 through the three phases of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the g loba l cris is
of 1998 and the reconstructi on effort culm inatin g at the o logne Summit in
June 1999. In doing so he hi ghlights how it was the G7 co ll ect ive ly that
ultimate ly prevailed , rather than the US a lone, the IMF as a broad multilatera l
organisation loc ked in a neo-l ibera l mode l. or pri vate sector markets and
multinational corporati ons. FUJ1her affi rming the leadership of the G7
co llective ly, rather than as a support group for American leadership. Kirton
demonstrates how Canada and Britain, the least powerful member. were ab le
to provide effective intellectual , policy, and tructural leadership by
adva nc ing distinctive positions, combinin g with other members. and
persisting to see their principles and positions preva il in the end .
Kirton' s analys is chall enges the traditional theories of why and how
effective G7 co-operation has been achieved . In contrast to theories based on
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the indispensable element of an American willingness and ability to lead . hc
shows how the G7 came together at the initiative of other members in the face
of a reluctant America deterred and immobilised at first by Congre s ional
opposition to authorising the US share of a quota increase for the IMF. and in
September 1998 by panicking market players on the verge of freezing its
domestic credit system. Nor of great relevance in inducing collective G7
action were common lessons from the distant past, a false new consensu
about the impotence of governments in the face of powerful markets and
private capital flows, transnational coal itions involving sub-governmental and
societal actors, or traditional differences between G7 members. Rather. the
autonomous power of international institutions was evident as Canada and
Britain were able to use their prerogatives and legacy as G7 hosts. and the G7
norms of consensus decision making to take and s ustain a leaders hip role.
Most importantly, it was the particular character of the G7 as a modern
international concert, in the face ofa systemic crisis, that allowed the smaller
members to lead the G7, and the G7 to lead the international community with
success .
Part II moves from the crisis, its consequences. and its containment to the
particular core issues that dominated the debate over the principles and
procedures on which a new international financial system should be based .
In Chapter 6, " Transparentising the Global Money Busine s: G lasnost o r
Just Another Wild Card in Play?", George M. von Furstenberg explores the
different meanings of the now highly fashionable concept of "transparency".
Noting that greater transparency always involves a redistributi o n of power. he
distinguishes between statistical transparency and political transparency, o r
glasnost, and highlights how both were evident in abundance in the decision s
of financial system reform at the Cologne Summit.
Given the many forms of uncertainty that exist in econom ic analysis, and
the capacity of both "offensive" and "defensive" players to benefit from more
information , von Furstenberg calls for greater skepticism o n the part of
policymakers and commentators about the progress to be made by securin g
greater statistical transparency alone. Indeed. he notes. a denial of data had
little to do with the outbreak of recent financial crises in developing
econom ies. and he judges that the greater transparency currently e nvisaged by
the G7 will do very little to reduce the risk of future tinancial crises. He does.
however, judge political transparency to be important. if it is linked to a
comprehensive program of reform, while hi ghlighting how it is the rich
players in the rich countries who are likely to benefit the most.
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In Chapter 7, "G lobal Cap ital Flows: Maximi ing Benetits. Minimising
Ri sks". Joseph P. Daniels exa mines policy responses of the G7 in li ght of the
perce ived benefits and probl em of liberali ed ca pital markets. He tirst
expl ai ns the eco nomi c benefits of liberali sed financial mark ets and high
quality interm edi aries. ext he con iders the probl ems th at pervade tinancial
markets and the constraints that capital mobility places on macroeco nomi c
po li cy. Additionally the role offore ign specul ators in the East Asian cri ses is
considered.
Given the preceding arguments, Daniels co nsiders th e proposal put
• forward in the G7 Finance Ministers' Strengthening the !lIternatirmo!
Financial Architecture: Report of the (i 7 Finance Min ister.l· to the Kii!11
Economic Summit. He fi nds that many recomm endat ions su pport the pri nc ip Ie
of minimal market interference and avo id crea ting additional ri sk or
dimini shing country credibility. Unfortunately, he also I'inds th at the G7 has
offered little to the likely ca ndidates offuture tlnancialmeltdowns. the larger
deve loping nations at an intermediate stage of financial development. Hence.
he co ncurs with the general view of Duncan Wood in Chapter 4. Dani els
concludes by suggest ing a set of re ponsibilities for the G7 in th e reform
process.
In Chapter 8, "The ew Financial Architecture forthe Globa l Economy'·.
orbert Walter take up the debate over tran parency. and over several othe r
central issues. notably the new Financial Stability Forum. equity rati o for
fin ancial in stituti ons. supervi ion. and th e broader questions surroundin g
Russ ia and the internati onal trade system. Dec laring that little has been done
to reform the system to cope with another finan cial cri s is that is sure to come.
he casts doubt of the adequacy of the GTs emphasis on surve illance and th e
re pon ibility of each co untry to maintain a sound eco nomic po licy. U eful
advances such as the Financial tability Forum and improved eq uity ratios for
financial in stitutions still require f urther work on the important detail s.
Additionally, calls for greater tran sparency and surveillance suffer from th e
fact that in a world of " Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" . the resultin g
systems will be ba ed on American models that other G7 governments, such
as Germany. will resist. _
More important. in Walter' view. is the fact that two fundam ental issues
have yet to be sati sfactoril y addressed. The lirst i the need to r a mec hani sm
to allow bankruptcy to take place in the tlnancial sector. The second is for G7
governments to stop the reca pitalisation or excess ive capitali sation o f ailing
financial in stitutions.
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In C ha pter 9, " The Ro le of the Internati o nal Monetary Fun d as Lender or
Last Resort" , C urz io G iannini exa mines how a lende r of last re o rt ca n deal
w ith financial instabili ty at the nati o na l leve l and \' hether th e conccpt of a n
inte rnati o nall ender of last re o rt makes e n e in today'sglobalise I econo my .
At th e nati onal leve l, he notes, th e mo neta ry framework a nd he nce th e lende r
of last resort functio n has now become very di ffe rent from th ose s pec ifi ed in
th e c lassic model, as independent central banks ha ve a ri sen to practice
" illuminated di scretio n" in pursuit ofa tab ility-ori e nted mo netary policy. At
th e inte rnati o na l leve L while th e founders o f th e Bretton Wood yste m kept
the lender of last resort function at the natio nal level, the question is now what
ca n be done as a lender of last resort in a g lo bal env ironm ent.
Gianninni's conclus io n is that ve ry littl e can be do ne, as a ny g ra nd des ig n
to transfer th e lende r of last reso rt function to th e internati o na l Ie e l sho uld
be regard ed w ith us pic io n. Indeed. the IM F is already movi ng in the othe r
direction. by providing c redibility so otherwi se tinancially frozen cou ntri es
ca n bo rrow for pri vate ca pital mark ets, by le nding into a rrea rs. and by
invo lv ing pri va te c redito rs thro ugh info rmal means in th e Ko rea n resc ue
pac kage. G inannini thus approves of th e creation of continge nt c red it lines.
and further m oves to make creditors mo re sensi ti ve to the risks th ey ta ke.
through ei th er improved wo rld wide reg ul atio n and supe rv isio n or debt
mo ratorium s w ith negotiated restructuring, The new Fina ncia l Stab ilit
Forum , with its emphasis on th e fo rm er. faces a dauntin g task . But its very
creati o n and earl y e mphas is suggest that th e IMF s ho uld refi ne its ro le ora
provider of c redibility, suppo rt mooth e r workout procedure. a nd avo id
thinking of itse lf as a world centra l bank.
Part III moves from th e debate over core financia l qu estions to the broader
iss ues c lose ly re lated to th em and ones w ho e treatm ent co uld we ll afrect th e
partic ular measures se lected and the success of th e ir use.
In C hapte r 10, "' Practi s ing Exc hange Rate Flex ibility" . li v ie r Davanne
a nd Pierre Jacqu et examine th e question. now at the centre o r th e debate. of'
the appropriate exchange rate regimes for e me rg ing and deve loped econo m ies.
and of the best international mechani sm for ensurin g th e needed tability in
th e face of ever-threatening vo lat ili ty, mi sa li gnment. a nd some tim es brutal
hifts from an undul y fix ed to a free floating reg im e, They o utline th e c urre nt
consensus regarding th e dangers of fixed exc han ge rates lo r e me rging
econo mies, a nd th e costs of th e a lternati ve, forcibly adopted by man y in the
wa ke of th e 1997-99 fin a nc ia l cri s is. of freely tl oatin g reg im es . They th cn
exa mine the advantages ora managed fl oatin g regim e. and th e ro le th e G7 and
IM F play mi ght play in effective ly manag in g it.
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Through their deta iled eco nomic and institutional. th eoretica l and
empirica l analys is, Jacquet and Dava nne make a powerful argu ment that the
current consensus needs to be rethought. Both econom ic rationality and the
record of past decades show that exchange rate fl ex ibility is necessary, and
that hi ghly fi xed exchange rate regim es should be relied upon only
excepti onally. Yet there is a broader array of available options, within which
stands out an "adjustable reference parity" reg im e. In managing such a
reg im e, the G7 and IMF, working in tandem. can do much to strengthen
monitoring and surve illance, and thus contribute substantially to exc hange
• rate stability.
In hapter I I. "Can Small Countri es Keep Their Own Money and
Floating Exchange Rates?" . Geo rge M. von Furstenberg looks inward at a
central issue of fin ance - that of exchange rates - and outwa rd from the G7 at
the sma ll er countries in the system. He asks in p~ rt ic ul a r what choice of
exchange rate reg im es ex ist for sma ll countries that have full y opened up to
internati ona l capital markets and free trade in finan cial services when they are
located in the vicinity of a large country or group of countries whose currency
is in wide international use. With G7 Finance Mini sters in the lead up to
Co logne advising th at such countries' should genera lly not defe nd fixed
exchange rates with borrowed money, and with most co untries save fo r Chin a
hav in g lifted traditional ca pital contro ls. the options fo r such countries reduce
to fl oating exchange rates, currency boards, and monetary uni ons.
Von Furstenberg concludes th at the first two of these optio ns. fo r small
and medium-sized countries with low credibility currencies. brin gs major
probl ems of currency substi tuti on and incompl ete hedging, to the point where
policy makers are dri ven to look at monetary uni on as a sa te haven. Monetary
uni on ca n take the form of unil aterally adopting as lega l tender the stro ng
international currency of a nea rby country, or the multilateral Euroland ro ute
of deep fin ancial integration on the basis of equality. The trend is thus towa rd
reg ional currency conso lidation, the disappea rance of many lesser currencies.
and the separate exchange rates and nati onal monetary poli cies th"t
accompany them.
Fi nally, in Chapter 12. " From Globa li sati on to Reg ionalism: The Foreign
Direct Investment Dimension oflntemational Finance", Alan M. Rugman broadens
the focus from the activities of short-term investors in financial capital to the
long-term toreign direct investment of mul tinational corporati on (M Cs). He
traces th e ri se and role of MNCs. how they vary widely by sector in th eir
degree of globali sation, and th e politi ca l power they exert in the face or
nati onal governm ents and intergovernm ental organi sati ons. In doin g so. he

('IIn/rihllli!JI1S IIml ( ·/IlII1t'I7,1!.CS

15

takes is ue w ith those who e mphas ise the de tabi li ing impact o r vo latile
ho rt-term financial tlows in a world of g lo ba li sed "cas ino capitalism" .
Rather, Rugman argues. th e proces of internati onal integrati o n is driven
by the stable, fo reign direct investm ents o f M Cs. w h ich engage
overwhe lmingly in a regionali sm based o n the rich triad count ri es or the US .
Europe, and Japan , rather than any comprehens ive g lo bali sm. For both triadbased MNCs in their production a nd marketing. and fo r gove rnm ents in their
e fforts to support and regulate the process by creating internati onal trade and
investment regimes. it is the home region rathe r than the wider wor ld that is
primary. The collapse of Asian economic growth in 1997 and the contagious
worldwide economic s lowdown and contagion of 1998-99 was a res ult in part
of the failure of Asian-based firm s and governments to deve lo p. through the
A ia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) or otherwi se, as stro ng
and successful a regional strategy and reg ime as those o r the ir North
American and European counterparts with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). Fu rther. the crisis 0.1'
1997-99 has driven a ll to turn even more away from g loba l strategy to the
relative safety of their regional bastion s.

Agreement on Fundamental Issues
Am idst the wea lth of ins ight and analysis that these chapters conta i n. th ere are
underl y ing agreements o n man y fund amental issues. Above all. the
contributors critica ll y assess and challenge man y core e le ments of the
e merging consensus in po li cy and outside inte ll ectual ci rc les about the new
ystem c urrently being constructed . Avo idin g any te mptation to ce le brate the
accomplish ments of the G7 guided effort thus far. they o ffe r at best a cautious
confidence that much of the crisis respo nse and syste m construction e ffo rt is
proceeding with competence and often in the correct directi o n. They sec.
however. that there is no gro und for co mplace ncy o r inactio n.
In "'Challenges and Contributions to the Conve ntional Wi sdom". the linal
chapter of this text', Kai ser, Kirton , and Dani'e ls summari se th e v iews of the
va riou s contributors by issue area . On th e ti ve fundamental questi o ns at the
heart of the inte llectual debate and po licy effo rt. the contributors offer :In
array of views, but also a large measure of :lgreement on what W:l S. is be in g.
and sho uld be done . Taken together. the e make a 'ubstantial contributi o n to
o ur understanding o f the debate over the international financial system thc
world needs to cope wit h in the twe nty-tirst century .

